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 ABSTRACT 
 
Many service transactions are highly complex, and their quality is difficult to ascertain for 
consumers. In order to have properly functioning service markets, the services thus often 
require regulation. However, with the advent of the WTO, international trade in services 
has become increasingly rule-bound. GATS has considerable, intricate effects on social 
regulation due to the characteristics of services. The allocation of regulatory jurisdiction 
between home and host country, for example, is rendered difficult by the process-based 
nature of a lot of services. The WTO US – Gambling dispute settlement report is the first to 
address GATS disciplines on social regulation in a detailed manner. This working paper 
submits that the US - Gambling report has increased interference with domestic social 
regulation and created regulatory uncertainty for WTO members. However, it is also argued 
that the real impact of the GATS on social regulation can only be understood by looking 
beyond the text of the GATS. GATS disciplines may become amplified through their 
interaction with domestic and other international law. The GATS also contains some 
“political” counterbalancing mechanisms that allow members to renegotiate their 
commitments. It is argued that these political mechanisms strengthen subsidiarity in the 
GATS, and make WTO dispute settlement bodies accountable to WTO members.  
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1 INTRODUCTION* 
This paper assesses the impact of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on social regulation. The assessment takes place 
through the market access disciplines of GATS, contained in Article XVI of the Agreement 
and as interpreted by the WTO DS Panel in US – Gambling. The Panel report is the first one 
to address GATS disciplines on market access and domestic regulation in a detailed 
manner.1 The report also sheds light on the interaction of key GATS disciplines relating to 
market access (elimination of quantitative restrictions), national treatment (non-
discrimination), domestic regulation (technical regulations, licensing and qualification 
requirements), the scope of the general exceptions (public policy objectives) and 
technological neutrality.2 The paper therefore also analyzes these interactions.  
The Panel report is relevant beyond gambling to cases where a WTO member regulates the 
means of delivering or of marketing a service. Examples that come to mind are the 
provision of telemedicine services, the provision of digital entertainment over the Internet, 
or insurance sales over the phone or via the mail. Sometimes, the remoteness of delivery 
may be inextricably linked to the content of a service, other times it may simply be one 
amongst several ways of providing, consuming or selling a service. The impact of regulating 
the modes of delivery or selling on the service itself will be particularly high where the 
content and means of delivery are closely linked. Where this is not the case, the impact of 
regulating the modes depends very much on market structures. 
This paper proceeds in four main parts. Section 2 explores arguments for and against 
involving the GATS in the social regulation of services. Section 3 outlines the key GATS 
obligations relevant to social regulation. Section 4 analyses how the GATS, as interpreted in 
US – Gambling, affects national social regulatory autonomy through the interpretation of 
the concept of quantitative restrictions. The analysis in Section 5 suggests that the 
interpretation and hence the effect of the GATS can be modified through political 
governance mechanisms, but that GATS norms can also impact on national legal orders 
through interaction with domestic and other international law. The concluding section 
evaluates this complex pattern of legal and political governance mechanisms, present in 
the GATS.  
  
                                                
* This article has benefitted from very detailed and insightful comments by Lothar Ehring, which are 
gratefully acknowledged. Many thanks are equally due to Annedore Leidl and Sonja Kaufmann for 
excellent research and editing assistance. 
1 The first GATS dispute concerned the EC distribution arrangements for imported bananas but the 
legal analysis focused primarily on the GATT. The Mexico – Telecommunications dispute concerned 
Mexico’s liberalisation commitments for the cross-border supply of telecommunications services and 
its obligations under the Reference Paper, while the US – Gambling dispute concerned the provision of 
gambling services via the Internet.  
2 Sacha Wunsch-Vincent generally applauds the ruling in US – Gambling for affirming the principle of 
technical neutrality, i.e. that the means through which services are delivered should normally not 
make a difference. He also concludes that the ruling is unlikely to have a chilling effect on the on-
going service negotiations. See Wunsch-Vincent 2006, 319. 
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2 NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS -- SHOULD THE GATS HAVE AN IMPACT ON 
NATIONAL SOCIAL REGULATIONS?  
The liberalisation of trade in services proceeds differently from the removal of barriers to 
trade in goods. Services are not usually subject to tariffs, leaving quantitative restrictions 
and domestic regulation of service providers as the trade barriers that have to be removed 
first. Domestic regulations are, however, the most common instrument of social regulation. 
This gives rise to the difficult task of distinguishing between unnecessary or discriminatory 
regulation and legitimate regulatory protection.3 
According to many international economic law scholars, the primary purpose of WTO law is 
to address a domestic public choice problem of national democracies: governments will be 
captured by domestic industries and develop protectionist regulatory policies that prevent 
cheaper imports from being marketed. The result is higher domestic prices to the 
disadvantage of diffuse consumer interests.4 The problem with national social regulatory 
policies is that they can be de iure discriminatory or, even if facially neutral, are motivated 
by economic protectionism and produce disparate impacts on foreign exporters. These 
scholars therefore see a role for WTO law in promoting the export interests of foreign 
companies and protecting unorganised consumer interests against strong domestic business 
lobbies.  
Others consider WTO law as a substitute for transnational democracy. These scholars argue 
that national democracies are incomplete because their regulatory policies produce 
extraterritorial impacts that these democracies fail to consider.3 In other words, national 
democracies are procedurally deficient because their policies affect unrepresented 
foreigners. The inclusion or representation of all foreign affected interests in national 
democratic decision-making is nevertheless neither theoretically desirable nor practically 
feasible. WTO law offers a substitute, mechanism for defending foreign interests, because 
it requires the importing WTO member to justify its regulations in terms of commonly 
accepted standards to other affected WTO members.  
WTO law is also sometimes seen as an instrument for more informed national decision-
making and for mutual learning among WTO members.4 Information deficits or the populist 
swaying of national regulators are perceived to be the main problem. WTO law is claimed 
to rectify these deficits through multiple mechanisms. For instance, it requires that 
members support their safety regulation with scientific evidence, without however 
prescribing what level of risk to tolerate. Under the general exceptions of the GATS and the 
GATT, members are called on not to apply regulations in a manner that would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international 
trade. The Appellate Body of the WTO Dispute Settlement System has interpreted this so 
called “chapeau” as requiring the importing member to examine whether different risk 
mitigation methods are in fact effective in achieving the importing member’s level of 
                                                
 
3 On the GATS’ impact on social regulation, see Delimatsis 2007; Krajewski 2003, xviii, 191-196; Sauvé 
1995, 125; Mattoo 1997, 107; Mattoo and Sauvé 2003, 2; Trachtman 2003, 57, 76-78; Pauwelyn 2005, 
131; Djordjevic 2002; Karmakar 2007, 127; Wouters and Coppens 2006. 
4 Petersmann 1993, 3. 
3 Joerges 2005, 553; von Bogdandy 2001, 609. 
4 Howse 2000, 2329. 
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protection.5 It, thereby, has created an implicit obligation on WTO members to be well 
informed before making regulatory prescriptions. 
On all these accounts, some impact of WTO law on national social regulations is perceived 
as desirable. However, the desirable guidance and constraining effect of WTO norms on 
social regulation has to be counterbalanced with due respect for national regulatory 
autonomy. There are several general reasons why WTO law needs to respect national 
regulatory autonomy: strong negative integration raises concerns of excessive judicial 
governance and lack of democracy, since there are few functioning global political 
mechanism that could correct erroneous judicial decisions.6 As long as the nation state is 
the key supplier of procedurally legitimate decision-making procedures, some degree of 
national autonomy needs to be respected. Sometimes local knowledge and the variability 
between countries might also put states or regions in a better position to decide on the 
substantive standards for regulating economic activity.   
In addition, trade in services has some unique features that complicate the task of 
balancing trade liberalisation with regulatory autonomy. Because services are intangible 
and complex, more important information asymmetries often exist between consumers and 
providers of a service than between purchasers and vendors of goods. This makes social 
regulation all the more necessary in creating functioning service markets. Service 
regulation also often takes place at the same moment as the services are provided. In the 
context of trade in goods, the regulation of production processes is sometimes perceived to 
be an unjustified assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction that raises suspicions of 
protectionism. While the distinction between production processes and methods (PPMs) and 
quality characteristics is already unclear for goods, there are several reasons for why it 
works even less well for trade in services.  
First of all, the complexity of and variability between service transactions can make it 
impossible to develop detailed quality standards. Consider the example of legal services. 
Due to the myriad of legal problems that clients encounter it would be impossible to 
specify content requirements. Instead, quality is ensured through requiring certain 
professional qualifications of the service provider, through regulating the manner in which 
the service is produced (e.g. conflict of interest rules), and through remedial justice 
(malpractice suits). For other services, it might be more appropriate to regulate the 
consumer of services rather than the provider. For example, insurance companies do not 
reimburse certain medical treatments because, although helpful, they fail to produce 
consistent results in all patients. The limitations on reimbursement indirectly regulate the 
provision of medical services because they push doctors and patients to rely on other 
treatments with greater effectiveness and consistency of result.  
Furthermore, the allocation of regulatory jurisdiction between the home and the host 
country is more complicated in the case of services. Verifying the quality of services is 
difficult because services (often) cannot be stored and controlled after they are produced. 
The verification of compliance with regulatory standards has to occur at the moment when 
the service is produced. When such a service is provided across borders or with the 
temporary presence of the service provider in the host country, the home country – which 
might even have equally effective regulation – cannot adequately control compliance with 
its regulatory standards or might have little incentive to do so. In these cases, the host 
country could possibly be entrusted with the task of controlling the quality of services and 
                                                
5 Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, paras. 161-165. 
6 von Bogdandy 2001, 609; Ehlermann  and Ehring, 2005. 
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enforcing foreign laws on its territory, yet it might do so with an administrative apparatus 
or testing method that is not adapted to the home country’s regulation. For other services, 
the home country might be able to control service provision in a cross-border context 
effectively. This still requires significant regulatory trust on the part of the host country in 
the capacity of the home country, and willingness on the part of the home country to use 
its own resources for economic activities that occur outside its borders.  
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3 THE KEY GATS DISCIPLINES ON MARKET ACCESS, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND 
DOMESTIC REGULATION 
Unlike the GATT, the GATS foresees no across-the-board liberalisation of services. Instead, 
it uses a combined positive-negative list approach to structure the liberalisation that leaves 
significant regulatory autonomy to WTO members. Members are free to narrow down the 
definition of service sectors and therefore the scope within which liberalisation 
commitments apply. They are also free to decide to what extent they want to grant market 
access, if at all, for example by limiting foreign shareholding. In addition, they are free to 
decide whether they want to grant national treatment to foreign service providers or to 
maintain discriminatory regulations. However, if they do commit to market access and/or 
national treatment, they must specifically inscribe any limitations on market access or 
discrimination that they nevertheless want to apply. Failing that, a member can still ‘save’ 
market access or national treatment restrictions, but only if they can be justified under the 
general exceptions of the GATS. 
Despite the considerable autonomy the GATS leaves to WTO members to enact social 
regulations of services, its rules also constrain members’ ability to regulate. First, the 
grandfathering of discriminatory regulation that the GATS allows pertains only to 
regulations existing at the time the schedules were negotiated. All future regulation with a 
discriminatory impact on foreign service providers needs to be justified under the general 
exceptions of the GATS. As the list of exceptions is limited, there is a potentially serious 
impact on the GATS on regulatory autonomy since some policies of WTO members might be 
incapable of justification. Furthermore, if members inscribe limitations on national 
treatment or market access for the wrong service sector, their attempt to safeguard 
regulatory autonomy fails. As the US – Gambling report shows, even a WTO-savvy country 
like the US can make the mistake of considering a particular type of service as falling under 
the wrong sector heading.  
Because of these impacts on social regulation, how the key GATS disciplines on social 
regulation are defined and interpreted becomes important. In principle, the GATS affects 
social regulation through the concept of quantitative restriction in Article XVI, the national 
treatment obligation in Article XVII, the disciplines on domestic regulation in Article VI and 
the general exceptions and chapeau in Article XIV and the security exceptions in Article XIV 
bis.   
Article XVI defines several types of quantitative restrictions that members cannot maintain 
in sectors and modes of supply for which they have made commitments, unless they have 
scheduled them as exceptions.7 If they are not scheduled, a quantitative restriction must 
be justifiable as a legitimate public policy under Articles XIV, XIV bis, and XII. These 
legitimate public policies include public morals, public order, human, animal or plant life 
or health, the prevention of fraud and deception, contractual liability in cases of default on 
service contracts, data privacy, safety, the equitable or effective imposition or collection 
of direct taxes, the avoidance of double taxation, national security and the maintenance of 
balance of payments. The list of public policies is considered to be finite.8  
                                                
7 GATS, Article XVI:2. 
8 Pauwelyn 2005, 131. 
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The GATS national treatment obligation prohibits members from discriminating against like 
services and like service suppliers of the service sector and mode of supply inscribed in its 
schedule, but subject to the express reservations made therein.9 Measures that are 
inconsistent with the national treatment obligation can nevertheless be saved under the 
exceptions relating to legitimate public policies.   
Unlike Article XVI, which establishes a per se prohibition on quantitative restrictions, the 
prohibition of Article XVII on discrimination only comes into play in case of likeness of 
services and service suppliers, and treatment that is less favourable. Pauwelyn argues that 
the different normative content is probably due to the fact that the WTO members 
considered domestic regulation to be so important and sensitive that they subjected it to 
softer GATS disciplines.10 Weiler explains the stricter scrutiny given to market access 
restrictions with the fact that market access is more important than national treatment, 
whose violation merely entails competitive disadvantages; market access exposes 
consumers to new or different services, creating the possibility for tastes to change.11   
It is noteworthy that Article XVII, unlike Article XVI, does not mention modes of supply. This 
entails that the use of a different mode of supply does not, per se, render services and 
suppliers unlike. If services that are supplied remotely and through a commercial presence 
and the respective service suppliers are alike, discrimination between suppliers using 
different modes of supply will be inconsistent with Article XVII. This is so unless an 
exception has been entered for the mode of supply concerned. Conversely, the use of a 
different mode of supply could also motivate a finding that no national treatment violation 
exists, if a service supplied through a commercial presence and a service supplied remotely 
are themselves alike but their suppliers are not.12 Consumers might, for instance, prefer 
the face-to-face interaction that only commercially present suppliers can provide. Modes of 
supply and market structures must also be considered in order to determine an instance of 
less favourable treatment. Modes of delivery and market structure can also be relevant to a 
finding of less favourable treatment. For instance, a regulation that is de iure indistinctly 
applicable to domestic and foreign service suppliers across modes of supply could still treat 
foreign suppliers less favourably. This would be the case where the foreign service suppliers 
primarily supply remotely and the regulation produces disparate impacts on the remote 
supply of the service, yet the difference in treatment is solely explained by the remoteness 
or foreignness of the service supplier. It is obvious that the possibility of cross-model 
likeness or less favourable cross-modal treatment considerably complicates the scheduling 
task of WTO members. Whether or not a national measure should have been scheduled as 
an exception to national treatment can sometimes depend on changes in consumer tastes 
or market structure that no-one could foresee at the time the schedules were negotiated.   
Concerning non-discriminatory domestic regulation, Article VI imposes several procedural 
obligations on the availability of judicial review, procedures to verify professional 
competence and prompt decision-making on authorisation requests.13 It also requires that 
all measures of general application that affect trade in services are administered in a 
reasonable, objective and impartial manner.14 The Council for Trade in Services is called 
upon to develop further disciplines on qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
                                                
9 GATS, Articles XVII:1. 
10 Pauwelyn 2005. 
11 Irwin and Weiler 2008. 
12 Pauwelyn calls this the permissive effect on social regulation linked to the reference to service 
suppliers. Pauwelyn, 2008, 359. 
13 GATS, Article VI:2(a), 3, 6. 
14 GATS, Article VI:1. 
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standards and licensing procedures.15 Pending the entry into force of these disciplines, 
members that have made specific commitments for a sector must not apply measures that 
nullify or impair the value of their commitments. The measures cannot be more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service and they must be based on 
objective and transparent criteria.16 Licensing procedures must not constitute a restriction 
on the supply of the service.17  
Article VI is odd, because it seems to contain a temporary necessity test, which will be 
superseded by the development of regulatory disciplines. This raises several questions. 
What is the legal effect of the development of regulatory disciplines? Do they extinguish 
the right of members to adopt standards of protection higher than those in the disciplines 
unless they can be brought under the general exceptions of the GATS? This would 
sometimes make the disciplines binding on members. Or rather, is it that they only abolish 
the necessity test, leaving members – effectively – free to do what they want in the area of 
licensing and qualification requirements as well as technical regulations, as long as they do 
not violate national treatment? It seems unlikely that Article VI:5 could sustain the latter 
interpretation, if one uses the desire to prevent the unnecessary obstacles to trade 
expressed in paragraph 4 as context for interpreting paragraph 5. The former interpretation 
has stronger textual support, but is problematic from a policy perspective, because it 
restricts the policy objectives that members’ regulations can pursue to the closed list of 
Article XIV.  
Related to this, a further issue is whether regulatory disciplines supersede the necessity 
test for the entire sector, or only for the specific matter, mode or subsector immediately 
dealt with by the disciplines. The latter would curtail the room for manoeuvre of WTO 
members to a considerable extent. Article VI:4 can be interpreted to avoid this latter 
result. It states that the Council for Trade in Services shall develop any disciplines 
necessary to ensure that unnecessary barriers to trade are removed. An argument could be 
made that the Council for Trade in Services has failed to discharge the obligation of 
developing any necessary disciplines if the disciplines have insufficient regulatory coverage. 
Article VI:5 goes on to state that the necessity test exists ‘pending the entry into force of 
disciplines developed in these sectors pursuant to paragraph 4.’ This language refers back 
to the obligation of the Council for Trade in Services to develop any necessary disciplines. 
It could be argued that the failure of the Council for Trade in Services to develop 
disciplines meeting the requirements of paragraph 4 ‘resuscitates’ the necessity test. The 
question remains whether the necessity test is ‘resuscitated’ only partially to cover the 
lacunae of the Council’s regulatory disciplines, or whether the lacunae entail that no 
binding effect whatsoever of the disciplines kicks in. This ‘fallback’ regulatory capacity of 
the nation state, nota bene, is very similar to the situation under the SPS and TBT 
Agreements. It seems, at any rate, to be the best policy outcome, given the limited 
expertise and decision-making capacity of the Council for Trade in Services. 
A related issue is whether regulatory disciplines of the Council for Trade in Services can 
also be attacked for being more burdensome than necessary, or for their failure to be 
based on transparent and objective criteria as required by paragraph 4.18 Since the 
suspension of the necessity test can be interpreted as being contingent on the Council’s 
disciplines being necessary to ensure the removal of unnecessary obstacles to trade 
                                                
15 GATS, Article VI:4. 
16 GATS, Article VI:4,5. 
17 GATS, Article VI:4. 
18 Ehring (2008). 
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pursuant to paragraph 4, WTO members would retain the right to adopt other necessary 
technical regulations and licensing and qualification requirements if the disciplines are too 
burdensome, untransparent or lack objectivity.  
It is unlikely that future disciplines would lay down substantive technical standards or 
harmonise qualification requirements, if the Accountancy Disciplines are anything to judge 
by. Rather, they are likely to continue to leave broad regulatory discretion to WTO 
members, focusing instead on procedural requirements pertaining to domestic regulation. 
For the foreseeable future, regulatory harmonization with the WTO seems an unlikely 
scenario.  
As Article VI and its necessity test currently stands, an important question for social 
regulation is whether a member has to engage in reasonable regulation pursuant to Article 
VI:5 notwithstanding the fact that it has made a national treatment exception in respect to 
the same regulation--presumably precisely in order to engage in a conduct that favours 
domestic suppliers either de iure or de facto. Unlike Article XVII:1, Article VI:5 does not 
explicitly make a member’s obligations subject to the conditions and qualifications set out 
in the schedule. Would Article VI:5 then, in effect, nullify discriminatory parts of a 
member’s schedule that relate to technical standards, qualification requirements and 
procedures and licensing requirements?  
Although Article VI:5 does not track the language of Article XVII:1, its obligation is 
contingent on the nullification or impairment of specific commitments, which could not 
have reasonably been excepted by the member at the time the schedules were drawn up. 
This suggests that a WTO adjudicating body would first have to ascertain the precise ambit 
of the member’s commitments. If it finds that the schedule foresees discrimination through 
the application of a technical standard, there would be no issue of nullification or 
impairment of the commitment since the member engages in conduct consistent with its 
commitment. Moreover, an adjudicating body would probably have to find that the member 
exporting the service could not have a reasonable expectation that a member will engage 
in reasonable regulation since the entire purpose of the national treatment exception will 
be to discriminate. The above considerations suggest that Article VI is not an instrument for 
domestic regulatory reform per se, but rather remains concerned with safeguarding the 
commitments made.  
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4 THE GAMBLING CASE 
4.1  Background information on the case 
The US – Gambling case concerned various pieces of US federal and state legislation that 
prohibited the remote supply of gambling and betting services19. The US alleged that the 
rationale for prohibiting the remote supply was to protect against underage gambling, 
compulsive gambling and fraud.20 The case was brought by Antigua and Barbuda (Antigua) 
on behalf of a US citizen and provider of remote gambling services established in Antigua 
who was jailed in the US for violating US laws.21  
The case involved three key legal issues. The first was whether the US had made a market 
access commitment for the cross-border supply of gambling services. The US schedule 
included commitments for other recreational services than sporting, and the US claimed 
that sporting covered gambling and betting services.22 The panel found that “other 
recreational services” included gambling and betting services.23 It found that sporting did 
not include gambling services and that the US had, consequently, committed to liberalise 
the cross-border supply of gambling services.24 The Appellate Body obtained the same 
result, but modified the panel’s interpretative approach.25 
The next legal issue concerned the question of whether the various pieces of US legislation 
amounting to a prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services 
should have been scheduled as a market access restriction. This aspect of the case will be 
discussed in greater detail below. The panel report, which was upheld by the Appellate 
Body, found that the US prohibition was a market access restriction that had to be 
scheduled.26  
As a result of this finding, the final legality determination of the case and third issues 
hinged on whether the US prohibition could be justified under the general exceptions 
clause of the GATS. The US invoked the exception relating to the prevention of fraud and 
deceptive practices and the public morals exception in respect to the objective of 
underage and obsessive gambling.27 Under both exceptions, the US was required to show 
that its ban was necessary to achieve the noted policy objectives.28 In order to be fully 
compliant with Article XIV, the US also had to show that it did not apply its ban on remote 
gambling in a way that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a 
disguised restriction on international trade.29  
                                                
19 Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and 
Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R, Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (hereafter referred to as US – Gambling). 
20 United States' first written submission to the Panel, paras. 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-18, 19-21; 
United States' second written submission to the Panel, paras. 46-49, 50, 51-56, 111 and 114. 
21 Pauwelyn 2005. 
22 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 162. 
23 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 7.2(a). 
24 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.93. 
25 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 213. 
26 Panel Report, US – Gambling, paras. 6.285, 6.286, Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 239. 
27 See n. 20.  
28 GATS, Article XIV(a), (c). 
29 GATS, Article XIV. 
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Antigua argued that the US prohibition was unnecessary and thus inconsistent with the 
GATS because the US had failed to consult and negotiate with Antigua with a view to 
finding less restrictive means of achieving the protection objective.30 The panel agreed 
with Antigua.31 In addition, the panel found that the prohibition did not meet the 
requirements of the chapeau because the US enforced its prohibition more strictly against 
foreigners than against domestic suppliers. The US also had failed to demonstrate that the 
Interstate Horseracing Act did not decriminalise remote bets in interstate commerce 
relating to horseracing.32  
On appeal, the Appellate Body overturned the panel finding that the prohibition was not 
necessary on the grounds that the panel had falsely attributed the burden of proof.33 It also 
disagreed with the panel in that there were differences in enforcement that would justify 
the finding that the prohibition was applied in a manner that constituted arbitrary 
distinction or a disguised restriction on trade.34 Concerning the Interstate Horseracing Act, 
the Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the US had failed to demonstrate that the 
act did not favour domestic remote suppliers of horseracing bets by decriminalising their 
conduct.35  
4.2 The decision on market access restrictions 
The unique feature of the US – Gambling case in terms of GATS provisions was the issue of 
whether the US prohibition on the cross-border supply of gambling services was a market 
access restriction, a national treatment violation or an instance of domestic regulation. 
Pauwelyn has aptly characterised this as the question of whether and when ostensibly 
qualitative regulation constitutes a qualitative restriction on trade.36 This technical legal 
issue is of great importance, as Pauwelyn points out, since market access restrictions that 
are not scheduled are per se violations that can only be justified on the limited grounds of 
Article XIV, XIV bis, and XII. 37 In contrast, Article VI on domestic regulation puts the burden 
of proof on the complaining member and has a much more indeterminate list of regulatory 
objectives that could justify introducing technical regulations or licensing and qualification 
requirements. The national treatment Article XVII puts an initial burden of proof on the 
complaining member to show that its services are alike or supplied by like service providers 
as a condition for the national treatment obligation to come into play. 
In terms of economic trade theory, the stricter treatment applied to quantitative 
restrictions as compared to domestic regulation makes sense: Quantitative restrictions limit 
competition to the number of suppliers within the quota. Suppliers outside the quota 
cannot compete no matter how competitive they are. Quotas can ensure sufficient market 
shares for domestic suppliers and can have highly protectionist effects. In contrast, the 
negative trade effects of discriminatory or unnecessary domestic regulation can still be 
absorbed by foreign providers as long as they are able to maintain low prices. In a nutshell, 
quantitative restrictions guarantee market share to domestic suppliers, while domestic 
regulation generally does not.  
                                                
30 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.525, Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 55. 
31 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.531. 
32 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.607. 
33 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 309. 
34 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 354. 
35 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 364. 
36 Pauwelyn 2005. 
37 Id. 
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Article XVI sets out six types of quantitative restrictions. The ones that were relevant in US 
– Gambling were (a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of 
numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an 
economic needs test, and (c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on 
the total number of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the 
form of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test. The panel found that the list 
of the six types of measures listed under Article XVI was exhaustive and that the definition 
of each of the six types of measures a - f was also exhaustive.38 The US prohibition 
therefore had to fall under one of the six types of restrictions for Article XVI to apply. 
Under the US prohibition on the remote supply of gambling services, the provision of 
gambling services over the Internet or the telephone was prohibited in interstate 
commerce and from abroad into the US.39 In other words, a qualitative regulation 
prohibited the cross-border mode of supplying the service altogether and had the effect of 
limiting the number of cross-border foreign and domestic service suppliers to zero.  
The panel found that the US prohibition was a limitation on the number of service suppliers 
in the form of a numerical quota and a limitation on the total number of service 
operations.40 For the panel, it was decisive that the US prohibited the cross-border mode of 
supply altogether.41 According to the panel, a prohibition on using a mode of supply 
effectively limits the number of service suppliers and service operations using that mode of 
supply to zero.42 In essence, the panel found that the effects of the US ban on remote 
gambling were enough to consider the ban a limitation in the form of a quota, even though 
the US laws never expressly set forth numerical limitations on the number of service 
suppliers and thus did not take the form of a quota.43  
The Appellate Body upheld the panel finding and also attached decisive weight to the 
effects of the US prohibition. It considered that Article XVI:2(a) includes limitations that 
are in form or effect quotas, monopolies or exclusive service suppliers.44 In order to justify 
its expansive reading of Article XVI:2(a), the Appellate Body first looked to the definition of 
exclusive service suppliers in Article VIII:5. Article VIII is concerned with ensuring that 
monopoly and exclusive service suppliers do not act inconsistently with the MFN obligations 
and the specific commitments and do not abuse their monopoly position when they 
compete with others outside of the scope of their monopoly.45 Article VIII:5 includes 
instances where a member, “formally or in effect, authorises or establishes a small number 
of service suppliers….”46 For the Appellate Body, the reference to ‘in effect’ in Article 
VIII:5 could be read across to the whole of Article XVI:2(a).  
The Appellate Body then turned to the actual wording of Article XVI:2 and, in a stretched 
interpretation, concluded that it was not clear that Article XVI:2 required the limitations to 
take a particular form.47 To the Appellate Body, Article XVI:2 is not primarily about the 
form of measures, but rather about their numerical or quantitative nature.48 Based on this, 
                                                
38 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.298. 
39 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.221, Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 43. 
40 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6330. 
41 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.330. 
42 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.355. 
43 See also Pauwelyn 2005. 
44 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 230. 
45 GATS, Article VIII:1,2. 
46 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 229. 
47 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling paras. 226, 231. 
48 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 227, 232. 
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the Appellate Body considered that Article XVI:2(a) should be read to include measures that 
have the effect of the listed limitations.49 Concerning the US laws, the Appellate Body in 
essence agreed with the panel that limitations with the effect of a zero quota are 
quantitative limitations and fall within the scope of Article XVI:2(a).50  
Krajewski suggests that the panel and Appellate Body saw the purpose of Article XVI as 
providing for effective market access51 – and were more concerned with promoting that 
purpose than with the text of the GATS, one might add. From the point of view of treaty 
interpretation, the panel and Appellate Body decision in US – Gambling can surely be 
criticised as a disregard of the text of Article XVI:2, whose term ‘in the form of’ would no 
longer serve any particular purpose.52 
The Appellate Body’s conclusions drawn from the definition of exclusive service suppliers in 
VIII with respect to Article XVI:2 are also unconvincing. First of all, it is doubtful that 
Article VIII can be considered as a context for the whole of Article XVI, given that the two 
Articles have very different purposes.53 Article XVI sets forth market access restrictions, 
while Article VIII deals with abuses of position by monopolies and exclusive service 
suppliers, and the contravention of the MFN obligation and scheduled commitments. Even if 
Article VIII were the relevant context, it would be logical to use it only to interpret the 
term “exclusive service suppliers” in Article XVI:2(a), with the effect that measures in the 
form or with the effect of establishing a monopoly or exclusive service suppliers fall within 
Article XVI:2. For the remaining terms of Article XVI:2 (numerical quotas and economic 
needs tests) only restrictions that actually take the form of quotas and economic needs 
tests would fall under Article XVI:2.  
The Appellate Body also drew on an example given in the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines to 
support its interpretation that a zero-quota comes within Article XVI.54 The Scheduling 
Guidelines give the example of “nationality requirements for suppliers of services 
(equivalent to zero quota).” Irwin and Weiler have been critical that the Appellate Body did 
not engage in any teleological interpretation as required by Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties before turning to supplementary means of 
interpretation.55 The Appellate Body’s use of the Scheduling Guidelines has also been 
criticised on the grounds that they are not binding and have little evidentiary value. 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body overlooked the fact that nationality requirements are 
origin-specific while zero-quotas of the type in US – Gambling are not.56 
 
                                                
49 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 230. 
50 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, paras. 234, 237-239. 
51 Krajewski 2005, 436. 
52 Panagiotis Delimatsis submits that the list of market access limitations in Article XIV :2 is not 
exhaustive. He points to the footnote 8 to this Article, which states that commitments on cross-
border supply and supply through commercial presence also commit a member to allow cross-border 
movement of capital. To Panagiotis Delimatsis, restrictions on capital movement are further market 
access limitations covered by Article XIV. From this, he concludes that the listing in Article XIV:2 
should be taken to be merely illustrative. See Delimatsis (2006, 1064f). However, as Pauwleyn claims, 
it is more reasonable to interpret the special mention of capital movement in footnote 8 as 
confirming the otherwise limited nature of Article XIV. See Pauwelyn (2005).  
53 Federico Ortino also questions whether Article VIII is appropriate context for the interpretation of 
Article XVI. See Ortino 2006, 135. 
54 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para. 237. 
55 Irwin and Weiler, 2008. 
56 Regan 2007, 1313. 
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4.3  The implications of the US – Gambling market access decision for the 
treatment of social regulation under the rules of the GATS 
The potential legal consequences for WTO members flowing from US – Gambling merit 
further discussion. It is important to be as clear as possible about the scope of the findings. 
Several commentators are concerned that almost all qualitative regulations could now be 
considered as limitations in the sense of Article XVI:2, since they will produce quantitative 
effects.57 Pauwelyn provides a graphic example of this when he queries whether regulations 
that require taxi drivers to pass driving tests will be considered limitations because aspiring 
taxi drivers who did not pass the test are excluded from the market.58  
Admittedly, the language about measures producing the effect of a limitation leaves it 
unclear whether “effect” refers to the trade effect on individual suppliers so as to catch 
nearly all mandatory qualitative regulation, or to the quota-like effects of a regulation on 
the total number of suppliers allowed to supply to the importing country.  
It is submitted that the language of Article XVI:2 provides some guidance on this issue. 
Article XVI:2(a) refers to limitations on the number of service suppliers. The reference to 
‘number’ suggests that the service suppliers in a given market can be counted and 
definitively established. Only regulations that actually establish a definite number of 
service suppliers are thus caught by Article XVI:2(a). Following the taxi driver example, the 
number of service suppliers is not definitively limited, since new taxi drivers that have 
passed the test can always enter the market and compete with existing suppliers.59 It is 
therefore unlikely that the finding about the quota-like effects extends so far as to capture 
all the regulatory measures that make the market entry subject to certain conditions, but 
do not impose limits on the number of suppliers. This observation notwithstanding, many 
other qualitative regulations may still be considered as quantitative restrictions in 
circumstances that will be expounded below. 
There persist several aspects of concern regarding the finding in US – Gambling. The panel 
seems to hold that even a prohibition on one of several ways of delivering services remotely 
will be considered to be a quota.60 Don Regan argues that this finding is correct.61 Consider, 
for example, the remote sale of insurance services. A member might, in principle, allow 
the remote sale of insurance but only via the mail and not over the telephone or Internet 
on the grounds that consumers ought to be protected against making hasty and bad 
decisions on insurances. According to Don Regan this type of regulation would need to be 
scheduled as a market access restriction. It is submitted that this result is not warranted, 
in the usual understanding of a quota, which implies fixing  a definite number of suppliers. 
In the example given, foreign and domestic distant-selling insurance companies can still 
fully compete in the market and are in no way limited by numerical quotas, 62 they merely 
cannot use certain selling techniques. However, that is a regulation, not a quota. It is also 
                                                
57 Pauwelyn 2005; Trachtman 2005, 801. Markus Krajewski considers that the ruling leaves it 
uncertain that other measures that effectively limit market access but are not prohibitions will be 
included in Article XVI. Krajewski 2005, 437. 
58 Pauwelyn 2005. 
59 Regan 2007, 1302. 
60 Panel Report, US – Gambling, para. 6.338. 
61 Regan, 2007, 1304. 
62 Similarly, Irwin and Weiler 2008. 
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readily apparent from the example given that such an interpretation of Article XVI would 
constrain regulatory autonomy to a significant extent.  
Commentators have also criticised the panel and Appellate Body finding for ignoring 
differences between zero and non-zero quotas and origin-neutral and origin-specific 
measures. Petros Mavroidis takes the position that Article XVI should only apply to origin-
specific quotas but not at all to origin-neutral quotas, whether or not they are zero or 
above zero quotas.63 He makes a number of arguments to support his position, some more 
textual, others more policy-based. All of them can, I think, be rebutted. He points out that 
Article XVI speaks about the treatment of foreign service suppliers.64 From that, he 
concludes that origin-neutral quotas should fall outside Article XVI, since they do not single 
out foreign service suppliers. This argument is not very convincing since an origin-neutral 
restriction will also treat foreign service suppliers in a particular manner. Mavroidis further 
submits that the Scheduling Guidelines envisage only origin-specific quotas.65 However, for 
economic needs tests and restrictions on the type of legal entities, this is not the case; 
they can equally be origin-neutral and apply to domestic suppliers. 
Drawing on more policy-based considerations, Mavroidis argues that Article XVI must be 
interpreted only as giving foreign but not domestic suppliers market access.66 This would 
prevent Article XVI from being turned into a deregulatory instrument. As the disciplining of 
origin-neutral quotas would also confer market access on domestic suppliers, Article XVI 
should be limited to origin-specific quotas only. He draws further support from the heading 
of the part of the GATS containing Article XVI. That heading is called specific 
commitments. Since commitments can only be made to foreign, but not to domestic 
suppliers, it is clear to Mavroidis that Article XVI must be limited to origin-specific quotas.67 
These arguments can be refuted. A number of GATS provisions, in fact, include incidental 
side benefits for domestic suppliers. The removal of a national treatment violation, for 
example, can also benefit some domestic suppliers wishing to see regulatory requirements 
lifted. Moreover, since domestic suppliers have no standing to bring claims under the GATS, 
members do not really make any commitments to them.  
In the final analysis, Mavroidis’ submission would turn Article XVI into little more than a 
specific list of de iure national treatment violations under Article XVII. He also admits as 
much.68 It is submitted that there is no good policy reason to limit Article XVI to origin-
specific quotas, because the economic effects of origin-specific and origin-neutral quotas 
are very similar. Both limit competition by preserving market shares for certain 
incumbents. As suggested above, the trade effects of quotas are worse than those of 
regulations that violate national treatment; with the latter the market still remains 
contestable. It can therefore be concluded that Article XVI should not be limited to origin-
specific quotas. 
Regan argues that an origin-neutral zero quota should not be considered a quota at all. 
When a member prohibits a service or mode of supply, it prohibits competition entirely. 
There is therefore no question of the member reserving market shares to domestic 
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suppliers.69 Under such an interpretation of Article XVI, WTO members would obviously 
enjoy much leeway in prohibiting economic activities on regulatory grounds.  
In contrast, Irwin and Weiler maintain that Article XVI should catch origin-neutral zero 
quotas that preclude the supply of a service, but should not catch regulations that merely 
require service suppliers to meet certain conditions.70 Their main concern is that Article XVI 
should safeguard the promise of market access that the members have negotiated. If a 
member totally prohibits the supply of a service into their territory, it reneges on its 
commitments. Using only a requirement of form for the application of Article XVI will not 
work, they point out. A member could escape the application of Article XVI by deleting any 
reference to numbers in its regulatory measure, instead making reference to the foreign 
nature of the service. They also offer textual support for their position. From the omission 
of anything like “Add Article III in the GATS”, they reason that WTO members intended 
prohibitions to be caught by Article XVI. There is no serious departure from WTO law since 
the SPS and TBT Agreements also apply to origin-neutral measures. The strict enforcement 
of commitments through the extension of Article XVI to zero quotas, Irwin and Weiler 
further argue, appropriately counterbalances the great autonomy members enjoy under the 
GATS. In a nutshell, Irwin and Weiler want to draw a line between measures impeding 
market access (should be caught by Article XVI) and measures making access conditional on 
meeting certain requirements (should not be caught by Article XVI). This is the line they 
consider the ECJ to have drawn in Dassonville and Keck cases, and they deem it instructive 
for the purposes of the GATS.  
There are several problems with suggestions of Irwin and Weiler.  It may be doubted 
whether the analogy between EU law and the GATS holds. In EU law, indistinctly applicable 
measures infringing Article 34 TFEU can be justified on the basis of mandatory 
requirements. In the GATS, a regulatory ban that impedes market access can only be 
justified on the basis of the limited general exceptions. If, as Irwin and Weiler suggest, the 
telos of the GATS is to strike a balance between liberalisation and regulation, then a 
construction of Article XVI that limits the right of WTO members to ban services to the 
grounds listed in the general exceptions is difficult to sustain. Irwin and Weiler’s proposal 
also requires some difficult qualitative decisions that a member negotiating commitments 
may not be able to anticipate. For instance, when does a regulation impose conditions 
whose fulfilment would alter a service to such an extent that it is no longer the same 
service? Are films displaying sexual conduct between clothed actors still to be considered 
pornographic? Or, are games played for a constant fee and with the chance to win or lose 
worthless tokens still gambling? And what about bans on activities that cannot be rendered 
acceptable by any regulatory means, such as human cloning or surrogate motherhood? 
There is no other way those services can be provided and yet the goal of the ban is clearly 
regulatory. Should the panels or the Appellate Body really ignore the obvious regulatory 
purpose and stick with an objective test in determining whether there is a market access 
restriction? 
The bottom line of the finding in US – Gambling is that origin-neutral prohibitions will be 
considered quantitative restrictions under Article XVI. Most qualitative regulations that 
make market access subject to some conditions still fall outside of Article XVI. However, 
some of these qualitative regulations could well be quantitative restrictions under the 
“effects” test, if they work to limit the supply to a definite number. For instance, what  
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about a qualitative regulation that imposes such demanding capital adequacy standards 
that, besides the domestic suppliers, only a handful of international financial service 
suppliers are able to meet them? Would such a regulation not in effect operate like a 
quota? The economic quota-like effects of demanding qualitative regulations will differ 
depending on the characteristics of the relevant market. Where entry costs for new 
suppliers in a particular service market are relatively low, even demanding standards that 
initially restrict the number of suppliers will not fix the number of service suppliers. The 
same could not be said about other service markets, where the costs for new entrants are 
very high.  
The economic effects of prohibiting a mode of supply also vary depending on whether 
competing modes of supplying the service remain permitted (through commercial presence, 
for instance). To the extent that supply through commercial presence remains a viable 
alternative, a prohibition on the cross-border mode of supply would not necessarily produce 
the effects of a quota within the importing market since the number of established service 
suppliers remains, in principle, unlimited. In comparison to domestic suppliers, it might, 
however, make it more difficult for foreign service suppliers to provide their services. 
Commercial presence generally requires greater initial investment and will often subject 
the service supplier to host rather than home country regulation. Regan thus argues that 
such a situation is a case of national treatment violation, but not a quantitative 
restriction.71 At first sight, this argument seems intuitive. However, consider the case 
where market entry for commercially present service suppliers is extremely difficult due to 
other regulatory requirements. Here, the regulatory regime of the member might indeed 
produce the effect of protecting the position of incumbents in the market and excluding 
any possibility for competition. What is more, Article XVI does not support a construction 
that would require looking at effects across modes in order to determine whether there is  
market access. Paragraph 2 prohibits members from maintaining the listed restrictions in 
sectors where market access commitments are undertaken. This could point to a cross-
modal approach to determine whether a limitation is present.72 On the other hand, 
paragraph 1 of Article XVI can be used as the interpretative context for paragraph 2. It is 
concerned with safeguarding the commitments made, and speaks of ‘market access through 
the modes of supply’.73 This suggests that each mode of supply has to be considered 
separately. 
The considerations above highlight that the “effects approach” of the Appellate Body in US 
– Gambling calls for a fairly detailed economic analysis. It ultimately leads to considerable 
uncertainty for WTO members contemplating what to schedule, because it amounts to a 
case-by-case analysis. From the point of view of safeguarding regulatory autonomy, this 
uncertainty over which legal rules apply to domestic regulation is unacceptable. It would 
seem that the sole way of creating certainty is to return to a formal criterion for 
distinguishing between quantitative restrictions, qualitative regulation and possible 
national treatment violations. Regulatory measures with the effect of, but not in the form 
of, a zero or non-zero quota would then either fall under Article VI or Article XVII. The 
former should catch origin-neutral prohibitions as technical regulations. 
As has already been argued above, members that have scheduled national regulations with 
quantitative effects only as exceptions in the national treatment column of their schedule, 
but not in the market access column, now incur the need to justify their measures under 
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the general exceptions of GATS Article XIV. They might, possibly, be in violation of the 
GATS despite their intention to exclude theh applicability of the GATS in respect of the 
specific measure altogether.74 The applicability of the GATS to sensitive measures, and the 
legal uncertainty members are faced with as a result of the decision in US – Gambling, 
could thus produce the paradoxical effect of reducing the members’ willingness to schedule 
commitments.75  
Finally, it has already been pointed out that the interaction between Articles VI and XVI 
could become problematic as a result of US – Gambling. As the regulatory objectives 
contained in the exceptions of Article XIV are limited, a broad application of Article XVI to 
qualitative regulations could preclude a fully GATS-consistent justification of technical 
regulations and licensing and qualification requirements through the more open list of 
regulatory objectives in Article VI:4, 5. Another ironic result of US – Gambling will be that 
any regulatory disciplines that the Working Group on Domestic Regulation develops will not 
provide a safe haven of GATS consistency with respect to any regulations with quota-like 
effects. Article VI provides no defence for measures that violate the market access 
commitments. In that sense, US – Gambling also limits the ability of the WTO to pursue 
social regulation.  
The above discussion has shown that, although the “effects approach” under Article XVI is 
likely to apply only in a limited set of circumstances, some qualitative regulations with 
quota-like effects which members had previously considered to be justifiable under Article 
VI, or consistent with their national treatment commitments, must now in fact comply with 
Article XVI. In respect of these measures, it seems that US – Gambling has limited the 
regulatory autonomy of the WTO members. 
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5   ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF INFLUENCE IN THE GATS: THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
US – GAMBLING CASE 
5.1 Schedule modification and suspension of concessions under the DSU as 
flexibility mechanisms? 
The US – Gambling dispute is also interesting because the US withdrew its commitments to 
gambling in response to the dispute settlement report. For an assessment of the GATS’s 
impact on social regulation through the market access disciplines, the withdrawal of 
commitments is important. It allows the US to avoid implementation and it also sends the 
panel and the Appellate Body a strong signal to limit their interpretation of Article XVI. 
At the dispute settlement meeting, where the reports in US – Gambling were to be 
adopted, the US criticised the findings concerning Article XVI. This issue has however not 
attracted criticism from any other WTO members in any of the subsequent meetings of the 
Dispute Settlement Body or the Council for Trade in Services.76 When Antigua followed 
through with the dispute and sought and obtained a determination that the US’ purported 
implementation of the US – Gambling dispute was still inconsistent with the GATS, the US 
took an unprecedented step: it sought to withdraw its commitments in the gambling sector 
pursuant to Article XXI of the GATS.77  
The question to consider next is what impact a US modification of its schedule would have 
with respect to the further steps in the US – Gambling dispute. Under Article XXI, the US 
may withdraw its commitments at any time, but it must enter into negotiations about 
compensatory adjustments with any affected WTO member that so requests.78 If no 
agreement is reached, the matter can be referred to arbitration, where appropriate 
compensatory adjustments can be proposed.79 If the US does not offer appropriate 
compensatory adjustments, the affected members who participated in the arbitration can 
suspend concessions vis-à-vis US trade.80  
Antigua and several other WTO members have already notified the Council for Trade in 
Services that they considered to be affected by the modifications of the US schedule.81 The 
US has reached an agreement on compensatory adjustments with several of them, yet it 
has not agreed with Antigua.82 At the same time, Antigua has stated that its notification is 
without prejudice to its right pursuant to the DSU to suspend concessions vis-à-vis US trade, 
as the US has not implemented the rulings and recommendations.83 In response to Antigua’s 
request to suspend concessions, the US requested an Article 22.6 DSU arbitration in order 
to have the amount of nullification and impairment reviewed. The arbitration lowered the 
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amount of nullification and impairment, and thus the level of concessions that Antigua may 
suspend, to US $ 21 million.84 
Several legal issues arise in connection to the Article 22.6 DSU arbitration and the US 
withdrawal from its commitments in the gambling sector. One concerns the question of 
whether the existence of a dispute settlement report and an authorised suspension of 
concessions precludes the US from modifying its schedule of commitments. The DSU is not 
explicitly made subject to GATS XXI, so that Antigua’s right could in theory persist.85 A US 
modification of its schedule, consistent with Article XXI of the GATS, might therefore at the 
same time be inconsistent with the DSU.  
Antigua could for instance argue that compensatory adjustment under Article XXI is not the 
same as compensation under the provisions of the DSU. Its rights under the DSU therefore 
remain intact. Moreover, Antigua could argue that the DSU and the GATS apply 
cumulatively, and that the US must comply with the DSU as well. Under the DSU, 
compensation and the suspension of concessions are viewed as temporary measures, while 
full implementation of the rulings and recommendations is the preferred solution.86 Since 
Article XXI GATS is silent on whether modifications of schedules may be maintained, the 
DSU would require their suspension. Finally, Antigua could argue that there is a conflict 
between the temporary nature of the compensatory measures in Article 22.1 DSU, on the 
one hand, and the ability to modify or withdraw commitments at any time under Article 
XXI, on the other. In such a conflict, it is generally considered that the right may not be 
exercised. 
Concerning the legal issue of whether the US would be free to maintain its modified 
schedule notwithstanding the US – Gambling report, it is submitted that the DSU can be 
interpreted as allowing that. Article 3.2 of the DSU stresses that the purpose of WTO 
dispute settlements is to preserve the rights and obligations of members under the covered 
agreements.87 It also states that recommendations or rulings of the DSB cannot add or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided for in the covered agreements.88 This provision 
is commonly interpreted as a safeguard against judicial law-making. It can also be 
interpreted to mean that a DSB recommendation in a specific case cannot deprive WTO 
members, including the losing party, of any of the rights they otherwise enjoy under the 
covered agreements, including the GATS. Article 3.5 DSU, which refers more broadly to all 
solutions to dispute settlement matters, can be interpreted in a similar manner.89  
It is also possible to argue that there is no conflict between the US modification of its 
schedule and the temporariness of compensation or retaliation. ‘Temporary’ can, after all, 
refer to shorter or longer durations. Since the GATS contains an in-built liberalisation 
agenda, i.e., it calls on members to further liberalise trade in services, it could even be 
argued that the US withdrawal of its gambling commitments is potentially up for disposition 
and in this sense temporary. It can thus be concluded that the DSU, likely, does not bar the 
US from modifying its schedule of commitments pursuant to the GATS.  
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Another issue is whether the US modification of its schedule extinguishes Antigua’s rights 
under the DSU, notably in respect of suspending its concessions vis-à-vis the US for the non-
implementation of the report. Neither the DSU nor Article XXI of the GATS deals explicitly 
with this issue. However, some provisions of the DSU can be interpreted to require that the 
suspension of concessions be terminated once an outcome under Article XXI has been 
achieved. Article 22.8 of the DSU provides that the suspension of concession shall only be 
applied until the inconsistent measure has been removed, until the loosing member 
presents a solution to the nullification and impairment, or until a mutually satisfactory 
solution is reached.90 It could be argued that the term “solution to the nullification or 
impairment” encompasses the situation where a losing member modifies its schedule of 
commitments pursuant to Article XXI of the GATS and offers compensation to affected 
members.  
Moreover, an offer of adequate compensation to affected parties by the modifying GATS 
member could be brought under the term “mutually satisfactory solution”. According to the 
DSU, a mutually acceptable solution is the preferred outcome.91 Withdrawal of the 
inconsistent measures is only the second-best option, followed by compensation and, as a 
last resort, the suspension of concessions.92 Based on this ordering of solutions, it could be 
argued that the modification of schedules with adequate compensatory market opening for 
affected members under Article XXI of the GATS constitutes the preferred option. The 
suspension of concessions following an Article 21.5 and 22.6 proceeding must then cease. 
The relationship between the DSU and Article XXI of the GATS is more difficult if the 
modifying member does not offer compensation and the interested member suspends 
concessions. Does the right to suspend concessions for the non-implementation of the 
rulings and recommendations of the dispute settlement report remain pursuant to the DSU, 
offering the affected member the opportunity to retaliate twice? The DSU and Article XXI of 
the GATS do not address this issue directly, but Article 1.2 of the DSU could be of some 
limited help. It states that the Chairperson shall determine the applicable rules and 
procedures in consultation with the parties in disputes involving rules and procedures under 
more than one agreement. It could be argued that ‘rules and procedures’ not only refers to 
rules and procedures concerning dispute settlement (in contrast to the first two sentences 
of that paragraph) but also to Article XXI, which could then supersede the right to suspend 
concessions under the DSU.  
There are two other new legal issues that the Article 22.6 arbitration and the concurrent 
US withdrawal of its gambling commitments has highlighted. First, must the level of 
nullification and impairment determined in the Article 22.6 arbitration be the full value of 
the commitment or the amount of trade affected by the inconsistency? The second issue is 
whether the amount set in an Article 22.6 DSU arbitration will also determine the amount 
of compensatory adjustment in an Article XXI GATS arbitration.  
In the Article 22.6 DSU arbitration, Antigua argued for an amount of nullification and 
impairment that, it claimed, was equivalent to the trade affected by the fact that market 
access for remote gambling services was not possible.93 Antigua also based its claims on 
Article 3.7 of the DSU, according to which the first objective of dispute settlement is to 
secure the withdrawal of the measure to argue that the appropriate counterfactual should 
                                                
90 DSU, Article 22.8. 
91 DSU, Article 3.7. 
92 Id. 
93 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.2. 
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be full market access for Antiguan operators of remote gambling services.94 The US 
objected and maintained that its measure was largely found to be consistent with the 
GATS, except for the chapeau violation relating to remote gambling services in 
horseracing.95 Consequently, it proposed a scenario where Antigua only has access to 
remote gambling services in horseracing, but to no other gambling services as the 
appropriate counterfactual for calculating the level of nullification and impairment.96  
For the panel, the issue was whether nullification and impairment should be calculated on 
the basis of a ‘full market access counterfactual’, the trade affected as a result of the 
inconsistency (‘inconsistency counterfactual’) or the most likely alternative compliance 
scenario (‘likely compliance scenario’). In a departure from previous arbitrations, which 
had used ‘full market access counterfactuals’ even though the defending party only lost on 
some points, the panel largely chose to follow the US. It stated that the level of exports 
that would have accrued to Antigua, had the US complied with the ruling, was the 
appropriate basis for determining nullification and impairment.97 It found that the 
counterfactual should be plausible or reasonable, and that what mattered was nullification 
and impairment as a result of the inconsistent measures.98 It then opined that it would not 
be reasonable for Antigua to ignore the largely successful Article XIV defence of the US99. 
The panel referred to a statement by the Appellate Body that the GATS inconsistency was 
solely due to the US’ permission of remote gambling services in horseracing by domestic 
providers.100   
The panel also rejected arguments on the relevance of likely compliance scenarios and the 
impact of Article 3.7 DSU on determinations of nullification and impairment. With respect 
to the most likely compliance scenario proffered by the US as the counterfactual, the panel 
held that the US did not have the freedom to decide among a range of potential compliance 
measures for the purpose of Article 22.7.101 It further noted that the determination of 
nullification and impairment should steer clear from imposing punitive damages and from 
providing for insufficient restoration to the complaining party.102 Concerning Article 3.7 of 
the DSU, the panel was of the opinion that the withdrawal of the entire US regulatory 
regime on gambling was not the only possible outcome allowed by Article 3.7, and it 
therefore rejected Antigua’s full market access counterfactual.103  
In a dissenting opinion, one arbitrator maintained that the US should not be able to benefit 
from its partially successful Article XIV defence.104 The dissenting arbitrator was also 
convinced by a sort of disguised protectionism or consistency argument by Antigua when he 
rejected the compliance scenario proposed by the US. He stated that it was not clear how 
the US would reconcile the need to protect public morals with full market access for 
remote horseracing gambling services.105 Furthermore, the arbitrator noted that it was not 
                                                
94 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.21. 
95 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.4. 
96 The US argued that it even had the compliance option of prohibiting its domestic suppliers from 
providing remote gambling services on horseracing. However, it chose not to propose the scenario as 
the counterfactual. Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.6. 
97 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.14 
98 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, paras. 3.23, 3.27, 3.58. 
99 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, paras. 3.43, 3.45. 
100 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.57. 
101 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.24. 
102 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.26. 
103 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.46. 
104 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, paras. 3.63-3.65. 
105 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.67. 
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unreasonable for Antigua to expect full market access on remote gambling services. He also 
considered that the DSU objective of inducing compliance had to be taken into account in 
deciding on an appropriate counterfactual.106 However, because the other two arbitrators 
voted in favour of the counterfactual, focusing only on the GATS inconsistency, the 
determination of nullification and impairment proceeded on that basis.  
It is suggested that the arbitrators in US – Gambling were correct in rejecting hypothetical 
or most likely compliance scenarios suggested by the US. What a party might or might not 
do to comply with a ruling should not matter at all for the purposes of determining 
nullification and impairment; Article 22 is concerned with the fact that a party has not 
complied. It is simply illogical to claim that no present nullification and impairment to the 
trade of the complaining member occurs because the loosing party might in the future take 
steps to come into compliance. In the case at hand, the US could also prohibit remote 
gambling in horseracing in order to cure the chapeau violation. It can be seen that the use 
of ‘likely compliance counterfactuals’ to determine nullification and impairment would 
undermine the whole purpose of the DSU, which is to preserve the rights and obligations of 
the members under the covered agreements.107 Article 22 is in that sense backward 
looking.  
The many practical problems of determining what the ‘likely compliance counterfactual’ is 
make it an unworkable approach. The arbitrators cannot know which way of complying will 
be the appropriate one for the legal and political context of the defending WTO member. 
By rejecting hypothetical compliance scenarios as the appropriate counterfactual, the 
arbitrators also avoided a lengthy examination of whether alternative scenarios would in 
fact comply with the recommendations and rulings. For example, in EC – Hormones, such a 
question would have been difficult for the arbitrators to decide upon, as one possible 
compliance scenario could have been the development of an Article 5.7 (SPS) defence. The 
examination of hypothetical compliance scenarios would moreover usurp the task of Article 
21.5 compliance proceedings, and would not preserve due process rights of the parties in 
the short timeframe of Article 22.6 arbitrations.  
Finally, it is submitted that the majority in US – Gambling, not the dissenting arbitrator, 
got it right. The DSU gives little guidance on whether nullification and impairment is to be 
determined based on full market access, i.e., with a counterfactual where the measure is 
withdrawn or based on the inconsistency alone. A legal argument could be attempted that 
the DSU presumes an adverse trade impact of breaches of obligations under the covered 
agreements, but at least does not preclude the possibility of rebutting this presumption. 
Article 3.8 DSU states: “In cases where there is an infringement of the obligations assumed 
under a covered agreement, the action is considered prima facie to constitute a case of 
nullification or impairment. This means that there is normally a presumption that a breach 
of the rules has an adverse impact on other Members parties to that covered agreement, 
and in such cases, it shall be up to the Member against whom the complaint has been 
brought to rebut that charge”108 As the Article speaks of rebutting “that charge” and a 
prima facie presumption of nullification or impairment, it could be maintained that 
members can also contest the trade impacts and not only the inconsistency. In addition, it 
states that there is normally a presumption that a breach results in adverse trade impacts. 
An e contrario argument could thus be made that in exceptional cases, no such adverse 
impact may be present.  
                                                
106 Decision by the Arbitrator, US-Gambling, para. 3.70. 
107 DSU, Article 3.2. 
108 DSU, Article 3.8. 
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However, these considerations are outweighed by considerations in favour of a ‘full market 
access counterfactual’.109 First, it is not clear how a panel can determine the amount of 
trade affected based on the inconsistency without also looking to likely compliance 
scenarios. Is the trade affected by the permission of remote bets in horseracing only--which 
would allow the part of Antiguan gambling services that is linked to horseracing--because 
the US might keep its strict regulation of remote gambling? Or is the whole Antiguan service 
industry affected, because the US might abolish the prohibition on remote gambling 
services altogether? Applying the ‘inconsistency counterfactual’ still requires the 
arbitrators to second-guess what the defending country likely wants to keep and change of 
its measures. Second, lowering the level of nullification and impairment in relation to the 
inconsistency fails to achieve the central purpose of the DSU: to provide security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system.110 A defending member would no longer 
have any incentive to implement dispute settlement rulings and recommendations in cases 
with minor inconsistencies, if nullification and impairment is determined with the 
‘inconsistency counterfactual’. Given the considerable time and expense of WTO dispute 
settlements, potential complainants might shy away from bringing cases if they obtain 
inadequate remedies. One might ask indeed why the defending member has not 
implemented the rulings and recommendations, if the inconsistency is so minor. 
Presumably, there should be no economic and political difficulty in doing so. Finally, it is 
incorrect to describe retaliation based on nullification and impairment as punitive – the 
DSU does not allow punitive damages for the defendant’s violation of WTO law, it merely 
sanctions the non-implementation of rulings and recommendations. 
Good arguments can be made for why the counterfactual chosen by the arbitrators was 
correct. The question then remains whether the level of nullification or impairment of an 
Article 22.6 arbitration can be read across or apply to an Article XXI arbitration on 
appropriate compensatory adjustment. Or would it even apply to the suspension of levels of 
concessions under Article XXI, if the arbitrators’ recommendation is not followed? It is 
submitted that nullification or impairment levels of an Article 22.6 arbitration are 
irrelevant to an Article XXI arbitration.  
First of all, Article XXI arbitrations are about determining the appropriate level of 
compensatory adjustment for the whole commitment, not about determining nullification 
or impairment from an inconsistent measure. The standard for compensatory adjustment 
under Article XXI is that the members shall endeavour to maintain a general level of 
mutually advantageous commitments that is not less favourable to trade than that provided 
for in the Schedules of specific commitments prior to negotiations.111 For the suspension of 
concessions under Article XXI, the standard is that an affected member may withdraw 
“substantially equivalent benefits in conformity” with the findings in the arbitration on 
compensatory adjustment.112 The different standards or benchmarks suggest that 
compensatory adjustment or suspension of concessions under Article XXI GATS is different 
from nullification or impairment under Article 22.6 DSU.  
 
                                                
109 I gratefully acknowledge Lothar Ehring’s useful insights on this issue, which have led me to 
reconsider my argument on this point.  
110 DSU, Article 3.2. 
111 GATS, Article XXI:2(a). 
112 GATS, Article XXI:4(b). 
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It is further suggested that there is an important difference between the withdrawal or the 
modification of a scheduled commitment and the non-implementation of panel or Appellate 
Body rulings. In the latter case, the trade impact is linked to the inconsistent measure and 
will thus remains stable as long as the inconsistency is not removed. In the former case, the 
member precludes present and future market access altogether. Even if market access was 
heavily circumscribed by GATS-consistent regulations (and thus not worth much in terms of 
actual trade volumes), the modifying member in effect states that even if it should make 
its regulatory regime more trade-friendly--for example by allowing remote gambling 
services--the affected members would not be able to benefit from this change in regulatory 
policies. The compensatory adjustment and the consequent level of suspension of 
concession are therefore forward-looking. Hence, it is to be expected that compensatory 
adjustments/the suspension of concessions under Article XXI will set higher amounts than 
nullification or impairment under an Article 22.6 arbitration.  
Based on these considerations, it can be concluded that the DSU takes a relatively 
permissive stance towards the non-implementation of rulings. Flexibility and scope for 
regulatory autonomy is thereby preserved, albeit at the expense of a rules-based trading 
system. Furthermore, the existence of dispute settlement reports does not preclude 
members from withdrawing or modifying commitments pursuant to Article XXI of the GATS. 
This offers further flexibility to members and permits them to avoid legal challenges from 
other WTO members to their regulatory policies or market access restrictions. Finally, a 
withdrawal or a modification of the schedule of commitments carries a higher “price” than 
a non-implementation of a dispute settlement report. If this is correct, the GATS limits 
flexibility somewhat, and turns reneging on commitments into an ultima ratio solution. 
5.2 Assessment of the US’ withdrawal of its gambling commitments 
As concerns gambling and betting, the US may be able to ignore the findings in the US – 
Gambling report relating to market access, its cross-border commitments and the 
requirements of the chapeau. Of course, this possibility has a price: the US may have to 
offer compensatory adjustments, i.e. to liberalise trade in other sectors, see its exports 
subjected to higher tariffs, or have intellectual property rights revoked. 
The subsequent US intent to withdraw its commitments in the gambling sector might serve 
as an incentive or as a deterrent to future dispute settlements. The litigants often have to 
bear considerable expenses in a dispute proceeding, which might, in the end, not achieve 
much if the defending party prefers to be subjected to retaliatory tariffs. This is especially 
true for small, developing countries. They are reliant on imports and end up shooting 
themselves in the foot by making foreign goods and services more costly, whilst not really 
hurting a large, diversified economy like the US. On the other hand, the dispute settlement 
could also be considered as a means of prying open new service sectors, if defending 
members prefer compensatory adjustments to changes in their regulatory policies.  
As concerns other US regulations, or regulations by any other WTO member to which some 
or all of the rulings and reasoning in the US – Gambling dispute could be applied, it has to 
be pointed out that there is no stare decisis in the WTO. Previous decisions do not 
automatically have to be applied and followed. In practice, they often carry significant 
weight, nonetheless. 
However, the US modification of its schedule also sends the signal to the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies that far-reaching interpretations that depart from the text of the GATS 
Alexia Herwig  29 
   
and affect salient regulatory policies, will not be accepted. This might lead the WTO 
dispute settlement bodies into treading more softly when reviewing regulatory measures 
pertaining to trade in services.  
For the US, the gambling dispute comes with a further twist, as its remote gambling ban 
might even violate the US constitution. In two US domestic criminal cases, defendants seek 
to dismiss criminal charges against them under the US Wire Act, which prohibits remote 
gambling. The lawyers argue that pursuant to the Charming Betsy Supreme Court decision, 
the US Act would have to be interpreted so that it does not conflict with the WTO GATS and 
DSU.113 They also invite the court to find that the final decision in US – Gambling is self-
executing, i.e. has direct effect, in the US legal order.114 In the Utah case, the District 
court failed to grant the motion to dismiss and found that the Charming Betsy doctrine only 
applies where the statute in question is ambiguous.115 The court also found that the plain 
language of the Wire Act contemplates prosecution and that in such cases, the US Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act (URAA) which implements the WTO Agreements states that US 
domestic law takes precedence over the WTO Agreements.116 Finally, the court found that 
WTO dispute settlement decisions are not binding on the US and that the provisions of the 
GATS cannot be relied on by defendants pursuant to the URAA.117  
In another US domestic case, a US provider of on-line poker games has brought a claim in a 
Washington state court alleging that the US ban on remote gambling in interstate 
commerce and the permission of intrastate remote gambling violates the US commerce 
clause, as interpreted in light of US treaty obligations. The ban favours established casinos 
and online horseracing bookmakers vis-à-vis providers of online poker games.118 In the EU 
context, similar claims could be brought under the free movement provisions of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the EU. In addition, foreign investors could bring claims against the 
US under bilateral investment treaties. This shows that the GATS may also produce effects 
on national social regulation by constituting a source of inspiration for claimants to use 
domestic laws designed to liberalise trade internally.  
                                                
113 Motion to Dismiss in Case No. 4:06CR00337CEJ (MLM), United States of America v. Gary Stephen 
Kaplan, United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, available via 
http://www.majorwager.com/articles/gk/7.pdf, 14-20, 22, Case No. 2:07-CR-286 TS, United States 
of America v. Baron Lombardo et. al. United States District Court, District of Utah, Central Division, 
p.23-26. 
114 Motion to Dismiss, USA v. Gary Stephen Kaplan, n. 113, 29-32; United States of America v. Baron 
Lombardo et. al., p.23-26. 
115 United States of America v. Baron Lombardo et. al., p 26f.  
116 United States of America v. Baron Lombardo et. al., p. 28f. 
117 United States of America v. Baron Lombardo et. al., p. 29f. 
118 Complaint Lee H. Rousso v. State of Washington, Superior Court of Washington County of King, 
available via http://pokerplayersalliance.files.wordpress.com/2007/07/lee_rousso_complaint.pdf, 6-
8. 
30  IES Working Paper 3/2010 
   
 
6 CONCLUDING EVALUATIONS 
How should one evaluate the outcome of the US – Gambling dispute? Does the fact that the 
US preferred to modify its commitments instead of implementing the report signal a return 
to old-style GATT diplomacy that was more concerned with preserving the balance of rights 
and concessions than with establishing a rule-based, technologically neutral regulatory 
environment for trade?119 Does the WTO’s rule-based trading system give way to interest-
based bargains and horse-trading as soon as important service sectors and/or domestic 
regulatory policies are at issue?  
The apparent danger of such a system is that developed countries will be able to buy 
themselves out of rules and obligations of the GATS and thereby deprive developing 
countries of the ability to export services of crucial interest to them. The developed 
countries need not necessarily offer developing countries much in return. Ultimately, 
countries affected by the modification of schedules have little leverage to seek 
compensatory trade liberalisation of interest to them, as the modifying member is not 
required to offer compensation and may prefer to see its exports subjected to retaliation, 
instead. Especially developing countries may end up shooting themselves in the foot if they 
increase tariffs on crucial exports from the modifying member. 
However, the possibility to modify schedules and withdraw commitments can also be seen 
in a more positive light as either being part of a framework of global subsidiarity or as a 
pluralistic accountability mechanism. With respect to the WTO, there is a concern about 
excessive judicial governance at the expense of the political and regulatory framing of 
markets. This concern arises for two reasons: First, in the WTO, the adoption of dispute 
settlement reports by the Dispute Settlement Body is now almost automatic, as non-
adoption requires a positive consensus of the WTO members. Thus, even if a sizeable 
number of WTO members disagree with the findings of a panel or the Appellate Body, they 
will not be able to prevent its adoption. Second, the WTO has almost no legislative capacity 
that would allow the members to correct erroneous or illegitimate dispute settlement 
reports, because the WTO in practice operates by consensus. 
Against the backdrop of the global subsidiarity approach advocated by Howse, the 
modification of a member’s schedule of commitments could be seen as correcting the 
WTO’s bent towards judicial governance. It allows politics, in the form of local democratic 
experimentalism, back in.120 Howse argues that if there is no longer any unifying ideology 
such as the embedded liberalism paradigm, that would legitimise a certain relation of WTO 
law to domestic law and politics, the governance of the WTO must become flexible and less 
rigid again. This permits the adjustment of GATS commitments or recourse to soft law 
mechanisms and plurilateral agreements instead of the now prevalent single undertaking 
approach.121 Although Howse does not argue this, it could also be maintained that the 
modification of schedules of commitment opens the WTO to non-trade issues that he sees 
as too often suppressed by the ‘old’ insiders of the GATT. It enables members to pursue 
                                                
119 The difference between GATT-style diplomacy and the more legalistic approach of the WTO has 
been elaborated in respect of dispute settlement. See Weiler 2001, 334.  
120 Howse and Nicolaïdis 2001; Howse 2002, 112f. 
121 Howse 2002, 113. 
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regulatory policies that currently cannot be defended under the rights and obligations of 
the GATS. The GATS can thereby stay attuned to new, emergent politics of the regulatory 
state.  
The ability to modify schedules also confers on WTO members the ability to signal to the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies that they disagree with certain interpretations. It could 
thus be seen as a form of review from below that functions as an accountability mechanism 
vis-à-vis WTO dispute settlement bodies.122 The WTO dispute settlement bodies now have 
to reckon with the possibility that a defending member in a future dispute might again 
modify its schedule in response to their findings. The threat of modification can thus 
constitute an ex ante accountability mechanism, as the WTO dispute settlement bodies will 
need to take the political dimensions of disputes into account in their decisions. Otherwise, 
they face the risk that their decisions are set aside as illegitimate. The modification of 
schedules would thus fit the model of a pluralistic global administrative law put forward by 
Krisch. Krisch argues that global administrative law is characterised by potentially 
overlapping global accountability mechanisms, whose relations to each other remain 
uncertain and unstable.123  
The modification of schedules--which essentially is a unilateral veto--should as an 
accountability mechanism work best if used sparingly. If Article XXI GATS is used in 
moderation, concerns about the breakdown of a rules-based trading system and about trade 
protectionist motives can to a certain extent be addressed. As has been shown, the GATS 
already contains some guarantees that Article XXI will be used sparingly. The members 
have to pay a higher price for withdrawing or modifying commitments than for not 
implementing dispute settlement reports. As the debate about the US invocation in the 
meeting of the Dispute Settlement Body shows, a modifying member is also subject to 
certain multilateral accountability mechanisms. Whether these will be sufficient to 
safeguard the interests of developing countries, or whether the compensation by the 
modifying member needs to be made mandatory, at least for the developing countries,  
remains to be seen. 
                                                
122 Several academics claim that instances where global adjudicatory bodies review national laws and 
national courts or governments in turn review decisions of international tribunal amount, together 
with other accountability mechanisms they identify, to an emerging global administrative law. See 
Kingsbury and Krisch 2006, Kingsbury, Krisch, Stewart and Wiener 2005. The present author would not 
claim as much since the term ‘administrative law’ requires the foil of a global legal and political 
order with clear allocations of competences and separations of power. No such global or international 
political system currently exists it is suggested that the term ‘accountability mechanisms’ is more 
appropriate to describe emerging phenomena of global judicial review and procedural rights such as 
the right to make submissions. 
123 Krisch 2006, 247. 
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